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Abstract 
How do intellectual property rights that determine the market power of firms influence 
the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy? To analyze this question, we develop a 
monetary endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of 
long-run economic growth. We find that monetary expansion hurts economic growth and social 
welfare by reducing R&D and capital accumulation. Furthermore, a larger market power of firms 
strengthens these growth and welfare effects of monetary policy through the R&D channel but 
weakens these effects through the capital-accumulation channel. Therefore, whether the market 
power of firms amplifies or mitigates the welfare cost of inflation depends on the relative 
importance of the two growth engines. Finally, we calibrate the model using data in the United 
States and the Euro Area to quantitatively evaluate and compare the welfare cost of inflation in 
these two economies and find that the R&D channel dominates in both economies. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal study by Tobin (1965), the relationship between inflation and economic 
growth has been a fundamental issue in monetary economics, and there is now an established 
literature on monetary policy and economic growth.1 The present study relates to this literature 
by analyzing an unexplored implication that the market structure has an influence on the growth 
and welfare effects of monetary policy. Specifically, we analyze how intellectual property rights 
that determine the market power of firms influence the effects of monetary policy on economic 
growth and social welfare in a monetary endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital 
accumulation are both engines of long-run economic growth. We find that monetary expansion 
that increases inflation raises the cost of consumption relative to leisure consequently reducing 
labor supply, which is an important factor input for R&D and capital accumulation. A reduction 
in this factor input in turn decreases economic growth and social welfare. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of these growth and welfare effects of monetary policy depends on the strength of 
patent protection. Specifically, a larger market power of firms strengthens the effects of 
monetary policy through the R&D channel but weakens these effects through the capital-
accumulation channel. Thus, the market power of firms has drastically different implications on 
the welfare cost of inflation under the two growth engines. Whether it amplifies or mitigates the 
welfare cost of inflation depends on the relative importance of the two growth engines. 
The above theoretical finding has an important implication on a recent policy reform. As 
a result of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS),2  many countries have strengthened their protection for intellectual 
property rights. For example, according to the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in Park (2008), 
                                                 
1
 See for example Gillman and Kejak (2005) for a survey of this literature. 
2
 The WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, which was initiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, establishes a minimum level 
of intellectual property protection that must be provided by all member countries by 2006. 
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107 countries have experienced an increase in the strength of patent rights from 1995 to 2005.3 
In these 107 countries, the average increase in the Ginarte-Park index is 0.82.4 Our theoretical 
result implies that the welfare cost of inflation would have increased in some of these countries. 
Given that innovation is likely to be the main engine of economic growth in developed countries, 
these countries would experience a larger welfare cost of inflation as a result of stronger patent 
protection. In contrast, for a developing country in which the main engine of growth is capital 
accumulation, our result implies that it should experience a smaller welfare cost of inflation as a 
result of stronger patent protection. 
The reason why the strength of patent protection has different implications on the growth 
and welfare effects of monetary policy under the two growth engines is as follows. For a given 
supply of labor, increasing the market power of firms raises the incentives for innovation and the 
share of labor devoted to R&D. This increase in the R&D share of labor tends to magnify the 
growth and welfare effects of the decrease in labor supply driven by monetary expansion. In 
contrast, increasing the market power of firms reduces the income share of physical capital and 
the share of labor devoted to capital accumulation. This decrease in the capital share of labor 
tends to mitigate the growth and welfare effects of the decrease in labor supply driven by 
monetary expansion. Therefore, the market power of firms has drastically different implications 
on the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy as the relative importance of the two 
growth engines changes. In other words, the effects of monetary policy are influenced by an 
interaction between the growth engine and the market power of firms. To our knowledge, this 
interaction has never been explored in the literature. 
                                                 
3
 There are a total of 122 countries in the Ginarte-Park index. Of these 122 countries, 119 countries have available 
measure of patent rights from 1995 to 2005, and only one country, Iraq, has experienced a reduction in the strength 
of patent rights during this period. 
4
 The index is a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent rights. See Park (2008) for details. 
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In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model using data in the United States (US) 
and the Euro Area (EA) to quantitatively evaluate and compare the welfare cost of inflation in 
these two economies. We consider currency and M1 as alternative measures of money. In both 
economies, we find that the welfare cost of inflation is much higher under the M1 specification 
than under the currency specification as in Dotsey and Ireland (1996). We also find a significant 
difference in the welfare cost of inflation between the EA and the US when we use M1 as the 
measure of money but a negligible difference between the two economies when we consider 
currency as the measure of money. Under both money specifications, we find that increasing the 
markup magnifies the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare in both the US 
and the EA; in other words, the R&D channel dominates the capital-accumulation channel. 
 
 1.1. Literature review 
Tobin (1965) argues that higher inflation stimulates the accumulation of physical capital via the 
substitution with money holding. In contrast to Tobin (1965), when money is required for 
purchasing capital goods (Stockman, 1981), higher anticipated inflation reduces real balances, 
capital investment and the level of output (i.e., the reversed Tobin effect). This theoretical result 
is also consistent with many subsequent studies in the literature that consider variants of the AK 
model with a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods and analyze the growth and 
welfare effects of inflation through elastic labor supply. For example, Gomme (1993) and Mino 
(1997) introduce money into the two-sector Lucas (1988) model via cash-in-advance constraints 
and emphasize how the money growth rate affects the consumption-leisure decision.5 Our result 
                                                 
5
 In a recent study, Itaya and Mino (2007) use an endogenous-growth model with a cash-in-advance constraint to 
show an interesting result that the growth effect of money supply depends on the preference structure and production 
technology. Specifically, if the production technology exhibits strong non-convexity or if the utility function has a 
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of a negative effect of inflation on economic growth is driven by a similar mechanism as these 
studies.6 Another branch of studies, such as Zhang (1996) and Jha et al. (2002), highlights the 
role of money in facilitating transactions for which a change in the inflation rate affects the 
consumption-leisure decision through transaction costs.7 These studies in general support the 
negative relationship between inflation and economic growth regardless of whether the model is 
based on a cash-in-advance constraint or transaction costs.8 In the present study, we explore a 
related growth-inflation relationship but introduce an additional growth engine that is R&D-
driven innovation. Specifically, we incorporate a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption 
goods into a unified endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both 
engines of long-run growth and allow for elastic labor supply. 
In contrast to the well-established literature on monetary policy in the AK model, a small 
but growing number of studies, such as Marquis and Reffett (1994), Funk and Kromen (2006, 
2010) and Chu and Lai (2012), has analyzed the effects of monetary policy on economic growth 
in the R&D-based growth model. The seminal study by Marquis and Reffett (1994) incorporates 
a transaction-service sector along with a cash-in-advance constraint into the Romer model. They 
show that higher inflation reduces growth through a reallocation of factor inputs from R&D and 
production to transaction services. Our model features a different mechanism from the Marquis-
Reffett model by having a negative effect of inflation on economic growth through a reduction in 
labor supply. Chu and Lai (2012) incorporate money demand into a quality-ladder model similar 
to Grossman and Helpman (1991) with a money-in-utility specification and analyze how the 
                                                                                                                                                             
high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, then there may be multiple balanced-growth paths that feature different 
growth effects of inflation. 
6
 A recent study by Chu, Lai and Liao (2012) analyzes the effects of inflation on economic growth in the Lagos-
Wright search model with AK endogenous growth and also finds a negative effect of inflation on growth. 
7
 As for monetary growth models with money in utility, see for example Wang and Yip (1992) and Ho et al. (2007). 
8
 In contrast, Itaya and Mino (2003) show that the Tobin effect (i.e., a positive growth effect of inflation) may 
emerge in an endogenous-growth model with transaction costs when labor externalities are sufficiently large. 
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elasticity of substitution between consumption and the real money balance affects the growth and 
welfare effects of inflation.9 Funk and Kromen (2006, 2010) incorporate nominal price rigidity 
into a quality-ladder model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of inflation on economic 
growth,10 and they analyze an interesting channel through which nominal price rigidity transmits 
the effects of inflation from the short run to the long run. The present paper differs from the 
abovementioned studies by (a) considering a unified endogenous-growth model in which both 
R&D and capital accumulation are engines of growth, (b) showing the different implications of 
firms’ market power on the effects of monetary policy on R&D and capital investment, and (c) 
comparing the welfare cost of inflation between the US and the EA. 
In an early study, Mansfield (1980) points out that higher inflation may reduce R&D by 
decreasing investment in the plant and equipment that are necessary for R&D and by increasing 
uncertainty on relative prices. Goel and Ram (2001) provide empirical evidence to confirm the 
latter effect by showing that inflation uncertainty has a negative effect on R&D. A recent study 
by Chu and Lai (2012) provides further empirical evidence that supports a negative relationship 
between R&D and the level of inflation using cross-country regressions. In addition to empirical 
studies, policy-oriented research also suggests that high inflation could potentially reduce R&D 
investment. For example, in Economic Development Indicators (chapter 8, 2005), “… high and 
volatile inflation also discourages investment, including human capital and R&D investment.” 
This study also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic growth. The 
seminal study in this literature is Judd (1985), who analyzes the effects of patent length on 
economic growth in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework; see also Iwaisako and Futagami 
                                                 
9
 In the monetary quality-ladder model in Chu and Lai (2012), a larger markup would also strengthen the effects of 
monetary policy through the R&D channel; however, their model does not feature the capital-accumulation channel. 
10
 Vaona (2012) incorporates nominal rigidity into an AK-style model with learning by doing to analyze the growth 
effects of inflation, and he provides empirical evidence that shows a negative effect of inflation on economic growth. 
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(2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007). Instead of patent length, we consider patent breadth 
against imitation;11 see also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Kwan and Lai (2003), Furukawa 
(2007) and Cysne and Turchick (2012). However, our model differs from these studies by 
modeling R&D and physical capital as two engines of long-run growth. Because patent breadth 
has asymmetric effects on R&D and capital accumulation, the overall effect of strengthening 
patent protection on economic growth is ambiguous due to a tradeoff between R&D and capital 
accumulation as in Iwaisako and Futagami (2012).12 The present study relates to this literature by 
analyzing how patent policy interacts with monetary policy to affect growth and welfare. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the monetary endogenous-
growth model. Section 3 analyzes the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social 
welfare. Section 4 calibrates the model to numerically evaluate the welfare cost of inflation in the 
EA and the US. Section 5 considers an extension of the model to examine the robustness of our 
results. The final section concludes.  
 
2. A monetary endogenous-growth model 
To analyze the interactive effects of monetary policy and patent policy, we modify the seminal 
R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) by (a) introducing a cash-in-advance constraint on 
consumption goods to model money demand, (b) considering variable patent breadth as in Goh 
and Olivier (2002), (c) incorporating a capital-producing sector as in Iwaisako and Futagami 
(2012) so that capital accumulation is also an engine of long-run growth, and (d) allowing for 
                                                 
11
 Chu (2010) shows that at the current patent length of 20 years, extending the patent length would have negligible 
effects on R&D and social welfare. Therefore, we focus on the analysis of patent breadth in this study.  
12
 See also Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), who analyze the asymmetric effects of blocking patents on variety 
expansion and quality improvement in an R&D-based growth model. 
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elastic labor supply. Given that the Romer model has been well-studied, the standard features of 
the model will be briefly described below to conserve space. 
 
 2.1. Households 
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function given by 
(1) ∫∫
∞
−
∞
−
−==
00
)(ln dtlcedtueU ttttt ψρρ .13 
Instantaneous utility tu  is increasing in consumption tc  and decreasing in the supply of labor tl . 
As for the exogenous parameters, 0>ρ  is the discount rate, and 0>ψ  determines the disutility 
of labor supply. Households maximize utility subject to an asset-accumulation equation given by 
(2) tttttttttt mclwarma piτ −−++=+ && . 
ta  is the real value of assets owned by households, and these assets consist of tangible and 
intangible capital. tr  is the real interest rate. Households supply labor to earn a real wage tw . tτ  
is a real lump-sum transfer from the government. tpi  is the inflation rate that determines the cost 
of holding money. tm  is the real money balance held by households to facilitate purchases of 
consumption goods that are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint given by tt mc ≤ξ , where 
10 ≤< ξ . The usual cash-in-advance constraint is captured by the special case of 1ξ = . Here we 
follow Dotsey and Ireland (1996) to consider a more general setup in which only a fraction of 
                                                 
13
 Our results are robust to a more general utility function given by )1/(ln 1 χψ χ +−= +ttt lcu  for χ ≥ 0. Derivations 
are available upon request from the authors. However, when χ > 0, the equilibrium allocations do not have closed-
form solutions. Therefore, we focus on the special case of χ = 0 for analytical tractability. 
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consumption expenditure is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.14 This generalization allows 
us to perform a more realistic quantitative investigation on the welfare cost of inflation. 
Using standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition for consumption is  
(3) )1(/1 ttt ic ξλ += , 
where tλ  is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2), and ttt ri pi+=  is the nominal interest rate 
that captures the opportunity cost of holding money as opposed to accumulating tangible or 
intangible capital. The optimality condition for labor supply is 
(4) ttt ciw )1( ξψ += . 
The familiar intertemporal optimality condition is  
(5) tttr λλρ /&−= . 
 
 2.2. Final goods 
Final goods ty  are produced by a standard CES aggregator using production labor tyl ,  and a 
continuum of differentiated intermediates goods )( jxt  for ],0[ tnj ∈  given by  
(6) ∫−=
tn
ttyt djjxly
0
1
,
)(αα , 
where tn  is the number of intermediate goods available. This sector is perfectly competitive, and 
the producers take the output and input prices as given. The conditional demand functions for 
production labor and intermediate goods are respectively 
(7) tytt lyw ,/)1( α−= , 
(8) αα −= 1
,
)](/[)( jxljp ttyt , 
                                                 
14
 See also Wu and Zhang (1998) who consider a generalized cash-in-advance constraint. 
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where )( jpt  is the price of )( jxt  relative to final goods. 
 
 2.3. Intermediate goods 
There is a continuum of industries producing intermediate goods )( jxt  for ],0[ tnj ∈ . Each 
industry is occupied by a monopolist who rents capital to produce intermediate goods in an one-
to-one fashion; i.e., )()( jkjx tt = . The monopolistic profit is  
(9) )()()()(
,
jkqjxjpj tttttx −=ω , 
where tq  is the rental price of capital. 
The unconstrained optimization yields a profit-maximizing markup of α/1 . Here we 
follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to introduce patent breadth denoted by η  as a policy variable by 
assuming that the unit cost of producing imitative products is increasing in patent breadth.15 Thus, 
without sufficient strength of patent protection, the presence of monopolistic profits attracts 
imitation. Therefore, stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a larger 
markup without the threat of imitation; see Li (2001) for a similar formulation of patent breadth 
in the quality-ladder model. This formulation is also consistent with Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) 
seminal insight on “breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price”. In summary, the 
maximum markup is determined by η .16 For the rest of this study, we assume αη /1< ,17 so that  
(10) tt qjp η=)(  
                                                 
15
 In this study, we focus on patent breadth and make a standard assumption in the literature that the patent length is 
infinite for simplicity. See for example Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) for an 
analysis on finite optimal patent length in the Romer model. See also Palokangas (2011) for an analysis on optimal 
patent length and breadth in an R&D-based growth model.  
16
 Alternatively, one can also view the limited markup as price regulation. For example, Evans et al. (2003) analyze 
price regulation in the Romer model without money demand. 
17
 Given a capital share of about one-third, the unconstrained markup would be 200% (i.e., 1/α – 1) that is 
unrealistically large. Therefore, imposing an upper bound on the markup also helps to separate the effects of markup 
and capital share. See Jones and Williams (2000) for a discussion on this issue. 
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for ],0[ tnj ∈ . This formulation also serves to provide a simple way to separate capital share α  
and markup η . The amount of profit is symmetric across industries and given by 
(11) 





−=




 −
=
t
tt
tttx
n
kqjxjpj )1()()(1)(
,
η
η
η
ω , 
where the second equality of (11) uses the market-clearing condition for capital goods ttt knx = . 
Equation (11) shows that a larger markup η  increases the amount of monopolistic profits, which 
in turn improves incentives for R&D investment; however, a larger η  also decreases the capital 
share of income ηα // =ttt ykq ,18 which in turn worsens incentives for capital accumulation. 
 
 2.4. R&D 
Denote the value of an invented variety as tnv , . The familiar no-arbitrage condition for tnv ,  is  
(12) tntxtnt vvr ,,, &+= ω . 
Intuitively, (12) equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset, where the asset 
return is the sum of monopolistic profit tx,ω  and capital gain tnv ,& . In the R&D sector, there is a 
unit continuum of entrepreneurs who hire workers trl ,  for R&D. The profit of R&D is 
(13) trtttntr lwnv ,,, −= &ω , 
where trtt lnn ,ϕ=&  is the mass of inventions created by the entrepreneur.19  The parameter ϕ  
determines R&D productivity. The zero-profit condition in the R&D sector is  
(14) tttn wnv =,ϕ . 
                                                 
18
 This condition can be derived by using (6), (8) and (10). 
19
 Although we consider a deterministic R&D process as in the original Romer model, it is useful to note an 
interesting result by Li (1998) who shows that this deterministic R&D process can be derived from an underlying 
stochastic R&D process. 
 - 11 -
This condition determines the allocation of labor to R&D.  
 
2.5. Capital production 
Denote the value of one unit of capital as tkv , . The no-arbitrage condition for tkv ,  is  
(15) tkttkt vqvr ,, &+= . 
Intuitively, (15) equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset, where the asset 
return is the sum of capital rental price tq  and capital gain tkv ,& .
20
 In the capital-producing sector, 
there is a unit continuum of firms that hire workers tkl ,  to produce capital. The profit is 
(16) tktttktk lwkv ,,, −= &ω , 
where tktt lAk ,φ=&  is the amount of capital produced. φ  is a parameter, and tAφ  determines the 
productivity of capital accumulation. To introduce endogenous growth, we assume tt kA =  that 
captures the usual capital externality in the AK model.21 The zero-profit condition is  
(17) tttk wkv =,φ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor to capital accumulation.  
 
2.6. Monetary authority 
The growth rate of money supply tM  is denoted by ttt MM /&=µ  that is exogenously set by the 
monetary authority. Given the definition of the real money balance ttt PMm /≡  (where tP  is the 
price of final goods), the inflation rate tpi  is endogenously determined by 
                                                 
20
 Here we have made a simplifying assumption of zero capital depreciation as in Romer (1990) and Iwaisako and 
Futagami (2012). 
21
 In Section 5, we consider an alternative specification for the laws of motion for capital and variety that allows for 
cross-sector spillovers. 
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(18) tttt mm /&−= µpi . 
Any change in money supply is redistributed to households as a lump-sum transfer that has a real 
value of tttttttt mmmPM piµτ +=== && / , where the last equality follows from (18).  
 
 2.7. Decentralized equilibrium 
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations ∞
=0,,, },,,),(,,,,{ ttktrtytttttt lllkjxylmc , a time path of 
prices ∞
=0,, },,),(,,{ ttntktttt vvqjprw , and a time path of policies ∞=0},{ ttt τµ . At each instant of time,  
a. households choose },,{ ttt lmc  to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking },,{ ttt rw τ  as given;  
b. competitive final-goods firm produce }{ ty  to maximize profit taking )}(,{ jpw tt  as given;  
c. the monopolist in industry ]1,0[∈j  produces )}({ jxt  and chooses )}({ jpt  subject to the 
level of patent breadth η  to maximize profit taking }{ tq  as given; 
d. R&D entrepreneurs maximize profit taking },{
,tnt vw  as given;  
e. capital-producing firms maximize profit taking },{
,tkt vw  as given; 
f. the market for final goods clears such that tt cy = ; 
g. the market for capital goods clears such that ttt nxk = ; 
h. the labor market clears such that tktrtyt llll ,,, ++= ; 
i. the value of households’ assets equals the total value of intangible and tangible capital in 
the economy such that ttkttnt kvnva ,, += ; 
j. the monetary authority balances its budget such that ttt mµτ = .  
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 2.8. Balanced growth path 
In this subsection, we consider the dynamic properties of the model. Given that the monetary 
authority sets a stationary growth rate of money supply (i.e., µµ =t  for all t), the economy 
jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.22 Lemma 1 summarizes this result, and the 
proof is relegated to Appendix A.  
 
Lemma 1: Given a stationary path of monetary policy (i.e., µµ =t  for all t), the economy jumps 
to a unique and stable balanced growth path. 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
On the balanced growth path, equilibrium labor allocations are stationary. Here we sketch 
out the derivations, and the detailed derivations are relegated to Appendix A. From (5) and (18), 
we obtain the steady-state nominal interest rate µρpi +=+= ri . Substituting µρ +=i  into (4) 
and equating the resulting condition with (7) yield the equilibrium allocation of production labor 
yl . Combining (3), (4) and (14) yields tttn nv λψϕ /, = . Differentiating the log of this expression 
with respect to time yields tttntntt vvnn λλ /// ,, &&& −−= , where trtt lnn ,/ ϕ=&  and ttt r−= ρλλ /&  from 
(5). Furthermore, we can substitute (7), (11) and (14) into (12) to solve for tntn vv ,, /& . From this 
procedure, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor 
rl . Similarly, combining (3), (4) 
and (17) yields tttk kv λψφ /, = . Differentiating the log of this expression with respect to time 
yields tttktktt vvkk λλ /// ,, &&& −−= , where tktt lkk ,/ φ=& . Then, we can substitute (7), (17) and 
                                                 
22
 In an earlier version of this paper, we consider a monetary version of the canonical Romer model in which R&D 
is the only engine of long-run growth and derive the transition path of the economy from a change in monetary 
policy; see Chu, Lai and Liao (2010). 
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ηα // =ttt ykq  into (15) to solve for tktk vv ,, /& . From this procedure, we obtain the equilibrium 
allocation of capital-producing labor kl . Finally, we compute labor supply using kry llll ++= . 
 
Lemma 2: The equilibrium labor allocations are given by 
(19) )](1[
1
ρµξψ
α
++
−
=yl , 
(20) 
ϕ
ρ
ρµξψ
α
η
η
−





++
−
= )](1[
1
rl , 
(21) φ
ρ
ρµξψ
α
η
−





++
= )](1[
1
kl , 
(22) 





+−
++
= φϕρρµξψ
11
)](1[
1l . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
3. Growth and welfare effects of monetary policy 
Applying tt xjx =)(  and ttt nxk =  on (6) yields 
(23) αα −= 1
,
)( tyttt lnky . 
On the balanced-growth path, the growth rate of output is  
(24) rk
t
t
t
t
t
t
y ll
n
n
k
k
y
yg ϕααφαα )1()1( −+=−+=≡ &&& , 
where kk lg φ=  is the balanced growth rate of capital and rn lg ϕ=  is the balanced growth rate of 
varieties. To ensure that these growth rates are non-negative, we impose the following parameter 
restrictions. Condition R ensures that 0≥rl , whereas Condition K ensures that 0≥kl . 
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Condition R:   
ηηα
ρµξρψϕϕ
/)1(
)](1[
~
−
++
≡≥  
Condition K:   
ηα
ρµξρψφφ
/
)](1[~ ++
≡≥  
Equation (20) shows that 
rl  is increasing in η . Intuitively, larger patent breadth increases 
monopolistic profits and the value of an invention providing more incentives for R&D. Equation 
(20) also shows that 
rl  is decreasing in µ . Intuitively, a larger µ  increases inflation, which in 
turn raises the cost of holding money that is required for purchasing consumption goods. As a 
result, households consume more leisure reducing the supply of labor l  as shown in (22), and 
they also decrease consumption reducing production labor yl  as shown in (19). The decrease in 
production labor yl  reduces the amount of profits ηηαω /)1(, −= ttxt yn , which in turn decreases 
the incentives for R&D consequently reducing R&D labor rl  and the variety growth rate 
rn lg ϕ= . To see this, substituting (19) into (20) yields ϕ
ρ
α
α
η
η
−





−
−
= yr ll 1
1
, where yl  is 
decreasing in µ . Interestingly, larger patent breadth strengthens the negative effect of inflation 
on R&D and variety growth. To see this, 0
1
1
<
∂
∂






−
−
=
∂
∂
µα
α
η
η
µ
yr
ll
; thus, a larger η  magnifies 
the negative effect of µ∂∂ /yl  on µ∂∂ /rl . 
 
Proposition 1: The variety growth rate 
ng  is increasing in patent breadth η  and decreasing in 
the money growth rate µ . Increasing patent breadth strengthens the negative effect of monetary 
policy on the variety growth rate. 
Proof: Recall that 
rn lg ϕ=  and note (20).□ 
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Equation (21) shows that kl  is decreasing in η . Intuitively, larger patent breadth reduces 
the capital share of income ηα // =ttt ykq  and the value of capital resulting into less incentive 
for capital accumulation. Equation (21) also shows that kl  is decreasing in µ  because the 
decrease in production labor yl  reduces capital income, which in turn decreases the incentives 
for capital accumulation consequently reducing capital-producing labor kl  and the capital growth 
rate kk lg φ= . To see this, substituting (19) into (21) yields φ
ρ
α
α
η
−





−
= yk ll 1
1
, where yl  is 
decreasing in µ . Interestingly, increasing patent breadth weakens the negative effect of inflation 
on capital-producing labor kl  and the capital growth rate kk lg φ= . To see this, 
0
1
1
<
∂
∂






−
=
∂
∂
µα
α
ηµ
yk ll ; thus, a larger η  mitigates the negative effect of µ∂∂ /yl  on µ∂∂ /kl . 
 
Proposition 2: The capital growth rate kg  is decreasing in patent breadth η  and the money 
growth rate µ . Increasing patent breadth weakens the negative effect of monetary policy on the 
capital growth rate. 
Proof: Recall that kk lg φ=  and note (21).□ 
  
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can infer the effects of inflation on economic growth in 
the R&D-based growth model and the AK model.23 As φφ ~→ , the capital-producing sector 
shuts down and the model reduces to a monetary R&D-based growth model. As ϕϕ ~→ , the 
R&D sector shuts down and the model reduces to a monetary AK model. The advantage of this 
                                                 
23
 In an earlier version of this study, we provide this analysis in the two models; see Chu, Lai and Liao (2010). 
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unified model is that we can analyze the effects of inflation when R&D and capital accumulation 
are both engines of long-run growth. Substituting (20) and (21) into (24) yields 
(25) ρ
ρµξψ
α
η
ηϕα
η
αφ −
++





 −
−+= )](1[
1)1(1yg . 
In this case, the effect of patent breadth η  on economic growth yg  is ambiguous. Specifically, 
0/ >∂∂ ηyg  if and only if αφϕα >− )1( . Intuitively, ϕα )1( −  captures the importance of R&D 
on economic growth whereas αφ  captures the importance of capital accumulation. In other 
words, if and only if the R&D channel dominates the capital-accumulation channel, then patent 
breadth would have a positive growth effect. As for the effect of money growth, it continues to 
be negative as before (i.e., 0/ <∂∂ µyg ). Finally, whether patent breadth strengthens the growth 
effect of monetary policy depends on the same parameter condition αφϕα >− )1(  as 
0/ >∂∂ ηyg . In other words, if 0/ >∂∂ ηyg  ( 0/ <∂∂ ηyg ), then increasing patent breadth would 
strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of monetary policy on economic growth.  
 
Proposition 3: Economic growth yg  can be increasing or decreasing in patent breadth η . If 
and only if αφϕα >− )1( , then yg  would be increasing in η . Economic growth is always 
decreasing in the money growth rate µ . Increasing patent breadth may strengthen or weaken 
the effect of monetary policy on economic growth. If and only if αφϕα >− )1( , then increasing 
patent breadth would strengthen the negative effect of monetary policy on economic growth. 
Proof: Apply simple differentiation to (25).□ 
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Finally, we analyze the effect of monetary policy on social welfare. Imposing balanced 
growth on (1) yields 
(26) 





−+= l
g
cU y ψ
ρρ 0
ln1 , 
where αα −== 10000 )( ylnkyc  in which the initial 0n  and 0k  are exogenous. Dropping 0ln kα  and 
0ln)1( nα−  from (26) yields lglU yy ψραρ −+−= /ln)1( . Proposition 4 shows that the effect 
of patent breadth on social welfare is ambiguous as in the case of economic growth. Specifically, 
0/ >∂∂ ηU  if and only if αφϕα >− )1( , which is also the necessary and sufficient condition for 
0/ >∂∂ ηyg . As for the effect of money growth on welfare, it is negative (i.e., 0/ <∂∂ µU ) 
because the negative effects of µ  on 0c  and yg  dominate the positive effect of increased leisure. 
Finally, whether patent breadth strengthens the welfare effect of monetary policy depends on the 
same parameter condition αφϕα >− )1(  as 0/ >∂∂ ηU . In other words, if 0/ >∂∂ ηU  
( 0/ <∂∂ ηU ), then increasing patent breadth would strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of 
monetary policy on social welfare. 
 
Proposition 4: Social welfare U  can be increasing or decreasing in patent breadth η . If and 
only if αφϕα >− )1( , then U  would be increasing in η . Social welfare is always decreasing in 
the money growth rate µ . Increasing patent breadth may strengthen or weaken the effect of 
monetary policy on social welfare. If and only if αφϕα >− )1( , then increasing patent breadth 
would strengthen the negative effect of monetary policy on social welfare. 
Proof: Substitute (19), (22) and (25) into (26). Then, apply simple differentiation and 0≥yg .□ 
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4. Quantitative analysis 
In this section, we calibrate the model to provide a numerical analysis on the growth and welfare 
effects of inflation and quantitatively examine whether the markup magnifies or mitigates these 
effects. We consider two monetary aggregates, currency and M1, as alternative measures of 
money held by households for the purpose of facilitating transactions. On the one hand, currency 
holding by households is a subset of monetary assets that are subject to the cost of inflation. On 
the other hand, M1 includes interest-bearing assets, such as demand deposits, which are partly 
immune to the depreciation effect of inflation. Therefore, we report the welfare cost of inflation 
computed based on currency as a lower bound and the welfare cost computed based on M1 as an 
upper bound. For the EA, we set the cash-in-advance parameter cm /=ξ  to 0.10 when we match 
the average ratio of currency to households’ final consumption expenditure from 1999 to 2010, 
and we set ξ  to 0.66 when we match the ratio of M1 to consumption. For the US, we set ξ  to 
0.08 when we match the ratio of currency to consumption and ξ  to 0.16 when we match the ratio 
of M1 to consumption. 
For each of the other parameters, we either set it to a conventional value or calibrate its 
value using an empirical moment based on data from 1999 to 2010. For the money growth rate, 
we calibrate it using piµ += yg , where yg  and pi  are taken from the data (to be reported in 
Table 1). For the R&D and capital productivity parameters φ  and ϕ , we calibrate them using the 
output and capital growth rates yg  and kg  from the data. Given yg  and kg , the variety growth 
rate can be computed as )1/()( αα −−= kyn ggg . For the markup η , we calibrate it using R&D 
as a percentage of GDP. Then, we use capital investment as a percentage of GDP to calibrate the 
value of ρ , and we use the labor share of income to calibrate the value of α . Finally, we 
 - 20 -
calibrate the labor supply parameter ψ  by setting the supply of labor l  to 0.33. In Table 1, we 
report the values of all these variables and parameters. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.1. Numerical results 
The policy experiment that we consider is to reduce the money growth rate to the level that 
achieves the Friedman rule (i.e., 0=i  which implies ρµ −= ). Table 2 shows that under both the 
currency and M1 specifications, reducing money growth increases economic growth and social 
welfare in both the EA and the US.24 However, the changes in the capital growth rate and the 
variety growth rate respond differently to the markup. Specifically, a larger markup increases the 
magnitude of the changes in the variety growth rate in response to lower inflation. In contrast, a 
larger markup decreases the magnitude of the changes in the capital growth rate in response to 
lower inflation. Overall, we find that the R&D channel dominates the capital-accumulation 
channel such that a larger markup tends to increase the magnitude of the changes in economic 
growth and social welfare in response to lower inflation. In other words, a larger market power 
of firms tends to magnify the welfare cost of inflation in these economies. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In the EA, the welfare cost of inflation under the M1 specification is 5.79% whereas the 
welfare cost under the currency specification is 0.88%. In the US, the welfare costs of inflation 
under the M1 and currency specifications are 1.76% and 0.89% respectively. Therefore, in both 
economies, the welfare cost of inflation is much higher under the M1 specification than under the 
currency specification. Furthermore, when we use currency as the measure of money, we find a 
                                                 
24
 The welfare changes are expressed in terms of equivalent variation in annual consumption. 
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negligible difference in the welfare cost of inflation between the EA and the US; however, when 
we use M1 as the measure of money, we find a substantial difference in the welfare cost due to 
the much higher money-consumption ratio in the EA than in the US. 
 
5. Extension: variety expansion and capital accumulation with cross-sector spillovers 
In this section, we consider an alternative specification for the laws of motion for variety tn  and 
capital tk . The following specification allows for cross-sector spillovers captured by )5.0,0(∈s . 
(27) trststt lknn ,1−= ϕ& , 
(28) tkststt lnkk ,1−= φ& . 
Given these new laws of motion, the zero-profit conditions in (14) and (17) become 
(29) tststtn wknv =−1,ϕ , 
(30) tststtk wnkv =−1,φ . 
The rest of the model is the same as before. In Lemma 3, we first discuss the dynamic properties 
of tt kn /  in this extended model. 
 
Lemma 3: Given a stationary path of monetary policy (i.e., µµ =t  for all t), the dynamics of 
tt kn /  is characterized by global stability such that it gradually converges to a unique and stable 
steady state. 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
On the balanced growth path, the growth rates of variety and capital are respectively  
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(31) r
s
t
t
n l
n
kg ϕ





= , 
(32) k
s
t
t
k lk
ng φ





= . 
Because tt kn /  is constant, it must be the case that kn gg = , which implies a steady-state ratio of 
(33) 
s
k
r
t
t
l
l
k
n 2
1






= φ
ϕ
. 
Although this extended model has a fundamentally different property that the growth rates of 
variety and capital are the same on the balanced growth path, we will show that our main results 
are robust to this extension. 
Here we first derive the equilibrium labor allocations. Following the same derivations as 
before, one can show that the nominal interest rate is µρ +=i  and the equilibrium allocation of 
production labor yl  continues to be given by (19). Then, combining (3), (4) and (29) yields 
t
s
t
s
ttn knv λψϕ /1, =− . Differentiating the log of this expression with respect to time yields 
(34) 
t
t
tn
tn
t
t
t
t
v
v
k
k
s
n
n
s λ
λ&&&&
−−=+−
,
,)1( , 
where ttt r−= ρλλ /&  from (5). Also, we can substitute (7), (11) and (29) into (12) to solve for  
(35) ty
s
t
t
t
tn
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t
tn
tn l
n
k
r
v
r
v
v
,
,
,
,
,
1
1 ϕ
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η
ηω
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
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

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
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−
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


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−=−=
&
. 
Substituting (35) into (34) and imposing the balanced-growth condition tttt kknn // && =  yield 
(36) 
s
t
t
yr k
nll 





−





−





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=
ϕ
ρ
α
α
η
η
1
1
, 
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where we have used 
r
s
ttn lnkg ϕ)/(= . Equation (36) shows that for a given tt kn / , R&D labor rl  
is increasing in η  as before. 
Similarly, combining (3), (4) and (30) yields tststtk nkv λψφ /1, =− . Differentiating the log 
of this expression with respect to time yields  
(37) 
t
t
tk
tk
t
t
t
t
v
v
n
n
s
k
k
s λ
λ&&&&
−−=+−
,
,)1( . 
Then, we can substitute (7), (30) and ηα // =ttt ykq  into (15) to solve for  
(38) ty
s
t
t
t
tk
t
t
tk
tk l
k
n
r
v
q
r
v
v
,
,,
,
1
1 φ
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α
η 
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. 
Substituting (38) into (37) and imposing the balanced-growth condition tttt kknn // && =  yield 
(39) 
s
t
t
yk
n
kll 





−





−
= φ
ρ
α
α
η 1
1
, 
where we have used k
s
ttk lkng φ)/(= . Equation (39) shows that for a given tt kn / , capital-
producing labor kl  is decreasing in η . Therefore, this model also features the tradeoff of patent 
breadth on capital and R&D, and this tradeoff will be reflected in the common growth rate being 
a non-monotonic function in η . 
Combining (19), (33), (36) and (39) yield the equilibrium allocations of 
rl  and kl  
respectively given by 
(40) 
ϕφ
ηρ
ρµξψ
α
η
η 1
)](1[
1 −
−





++
−
=rl , 
(41) )1()](1[
1
−
−





++
=
ηϕφ
ρ
ρµξψ
α
ηk
l . 
Finally, we can compute the supply of labor given by 
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 Substituting (33), (40) and (41) into (31) or (32) yields  
(43) ρ
ρµξψ
ϕφα
η
η
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


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

++
−
== )](1[
1
kn gg , 
which is also the growth rate of output because kny ggg ==  in this model. Equation (43) shows 
that the growth rate is an inverted-U function in patent breadth η  due to the tradeoff between 
R&D and capital investment as in Iwaisako and Futagami (2012) and the growth rate reaches a 
maximum at 2≡=ηη . Also, the growth rate is always decreasing in the money growth rate µ  
as before. Whether increasing patent breadth strengthens or weakens this negative effect of 
monetary policy on economic growth depends on whether η  is on the upward-sloping side (i.e., 
the R&D channel dominates) or the downward-sloping side (i.e., the capital-accumulation 
channel dominates) of the curve. Given that the empirical markup is often estimated to be less 
than 100% (i.e., 2<η ), 25  the R&D channel is likely to dominate the capital-accumulation 
channel. Finally, one can also show that on the balanced growth path, welfare is monotonically 
decreasing in the money growth rate µ , and increasing patent breadth strengthens (weakens) this 
negative effect of monetary policy on welfare if η  is less (greater) than η .26 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we have revisited a fundamental question in monetary economics originally raised 
by Tobin (1965) on the relationship between inflation and economic growth. The key departure 
from the literature is that we consider both innovation and capital accumulation as engines of 
                                                 
25
 See for example Jones and Williams (2000) for a discussion on the empirical range of the markup. 
26
 Derivations are contained in an unpublished appendix (please see Appendix B) that is available upon request. 
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economic growth in the long run. In summary, we find that the growth and welfare effects of 
inflation and monetary policy are largely influenced by an unexplored interaction between the 
growth engine and the strength of patent protection. We believe that this interaction sheds some 
light on the importance of the growth engine and an interaction between monetary and patent 
policies that have been neglected in the growth-inflation literature.  
Finally, it is well-known that the Romer model exhibits scale effects.27 In this study, we 
normalize the size of population to unity, so that population size does not appear in the 
equilibrium growth rate. Instead, it is the supply of labor that affects growth; in other words, 
when R&D scientists and engineers devote more time to research, they generate more inventions. 
We believe that this implication is more plausible than the original version of scale effects based 
on population size. Nevertheless, it may be fruitful for future studies to further revisit the growth 
and welfare effects of monetary policy using other vintages of the R&D-based growth model. 
 
                                                 
27
 See Jones (1999) for an excellent discussion on scale effects in R&D-based growth models. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: In this proof, we first show that ti  is stationary given a constant µ . Using (5) 
and (18), we have 
(A1) 
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t
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−+−=+= µλ
λρpi , 
where tttt ccmm // && =  because tt cm ξ= . Taking the log of (3) and differentiating with time 
yields 
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Substituting (A2) into (A1) and then rearranging terms yield 
(A3) )(1 µρξ −−
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+= ttt iii& . 
Given the saddle-point stability of this dynamic system, ti  jumps to its steady state µρ +=ti . 
 In the rest of this proof, we show that given a constant ti , equilibrium labor allocations 
are also stationary. Combining (4) and (7) yields 
(A4) )1(
1
,
t
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l ξψ
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−
= , 
where we have applied the resource constraint for final goods tt yc = . Equation (A4) shows that 
tyl ,  must be stationary given a constant ti . Combining (3), (4) and (14) yields.  
(A5) tttn nv λψϕ /, = . 
Differentiating the log of (A5) with respect to time yields  
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Substituting (6), (7), (8), (11) and (14) into (12), we obtain 
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Substituting (A7), (5) and trtt lnn ,/ ϕ=&  into (A6) yields 
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which shows that trl ,  is stationary given a constant tyl , . Combining (3), (4) and (17) yields  
(A9) tttk kv λψφ /, = . 
Differentiating the log of (A9) with respect to time yields  
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Substituting (6), (7), (8), (10) and (17) into (15), we obtain 
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Substituting (A11), (5) and tktt lkk ,/ φ=&  into (A10) yields 
(A12) φ
ρ
α
α
η
−





−
= tytk ll ,, 1
1
, 
which shows that tkl ,  is stationary given a constant tyl , . Finally, the labor resource constraint is 
(A13) tktrtyt llll ,,, ++= , 
which shows that tl  must be stationary given constant tyl , , trl ,  and tkl , .□ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting µρ +=ti  into (A4) yields (19). Substituting (19) into (A8) and 
(A12) yields (20) and (21). Finally, substituting (19), (20) and (21) into (A13) yields (22).□ 
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Proof of Lemma 3: Following the same derivations as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show 
that ti  has the same dynamics as in (A3) that is characterized by saddle-point stability such that it 
simply jumps to its steady state given by µρ +=ti . As a result, (A4) implies that tyl ,  also jumps 
to its steady state given by )]1(/[)1(
, tty il ξψα +−= .  
In the rest of this proof, we show that the dynamics of a transformed variable ttt knz /≡  
is characterized by global stability such that tz  being a state variable gradually converges to a 
steady-state value. Taking the difference between (34) and (37) yields  
(A14) 
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where 021 >− s . Substituting (35) and (38) into (A14) yields 
(A15) 
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where yl  is constant along the transition path of tz . The interior steady-state value of tz  is given 
by )2/(1]/)1[( stz φϕη −= . Figure 1 plots the dynamics of tz  characterized by global stability.□ 
 
 
 
 
tz  
tz&  
)2/(1]/)1[( sφϕη −  
0 
Figure 1: Phase diagram 
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Appendix B (not for publication) 
In this unpublished appendix, we provide a proof for the following results in the extended model 
of Section 5. On the balanced growth path, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money 
growth rate µ , and patent breadth strengthens (weakens) this negative effect of monetary policy 
on welfare if η  is less (greater) than 2≡η . 
From (26), we can obtain the balanced-growth level of social welfare given by 
(B1) 





−+−+−+= l
g
lnkU yy ψρ
ααα
ρ
ln)1(ln)1(ln1 00 . 
From the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A, the steady-state ratio of )2/(100 ]/)1[(/ skn φϕη −=  is 
independent of µ . From (19), (42) and (43), we can show that the effects of monetary policy on 
production labor, labor supply and economic growth are respectively 
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∂
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Equations (B2)-(B4) show that an increase in the monetary target µ  reduces production labor, 
labor supply and the growth rate. Overall, the welfare effect of monetary policy is 
(B5) .11
µ
ψ
µρµ
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∂
∂
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∂
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Substituting (B2)-(B4) into (B5) and then applying yg  from (43), (B5) becomes 
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Equation (B6) shows that welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate µ . 
Finally, taking the absolute value of (B6) and differentiating it with respect to η  yields 
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where we have used  
(B8) 2if;0
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Therefore, patent breadth strengthens (weakens) the negative effect of monetary policy on social 
welfare if η  is less (greater) than 2≡η .□ 
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Table 1a: Values of the variables and parameters in the EA 
Variables π gy gk gn R&D/GDP I/GDP wl/GDP m/c 
Currency specification 0.0198 0.0153 0.0296 0.0052 0.0190 0.1823 0.6685 0.1042 
M1 specification 0.0198 0.0153 0.0296 0.0052 0.0190 0.1823 0.6686 0.6609 
Parameters ρ α µ φ φ η ψ ξ 
Currency specification 0.0132 0.4150 0.0351 0.3289 0.5495 1.2569 2.5236 0.1042 
M1 specification 0.0132 0.4150 0.0351 0.3289 0.5495 1.2569 2.4578 0.6609 
Source: All data is obtained from Statistical Data Warehouse (ECB) except for (a) the data on R&D share of GDP and capital investment share of GDP sourced from 
Eurostat (European Commission), and (b) the data on labor compensation wl sourced from National Accounts of OECD Countries. The data set contains observations 
from 1999 to 2010. However, for labor compensation that does not have a complete data series from 1999 to 2010, we use available observations from 2003 to 2009. 
 
Table 1b: Values of the variables and parameters in the US  
Variables π gy
 
gk
 
gn
 
R&D/GDP I/GDP wl/GDP m/c 
Currency specification 0.0246 0.0206 0.0307 0.0143 0.0268 0.1554 0.6871 0.0805 
M1 specification 0.0246 0.0206 0.0307 0.0143 0.0268 0.1554 0.6871 0.1587 
Parameters ρ α µ φ φ η ψ ξ 
Currency specification 0.0189 0.3826 0.0452 0.4113 1.1142 1.2473 2.5329 0.0805 
M1 specification 0.0189 0.3826 0.0452 0.4113 1.1142 1.2473 2.5204 0.1587 
Source: All data is obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data database except for (a) the data on capital stock sourced from Bureau of Economic Analysis, (b) 
the data on R&D share of GDP sourced from the OECD database, and (c) the data on labor compensation sourced from National Accounts of OECD Countries. The 
data set contains observations from 1999 to 2010. However, for labor compensation and R&D share of GDP that do not have a complete data series from 1999 to 2010, 
we use available observations from 2003 to 2009 and from 1999 to 2009 respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Growth and welfare effects of reducing µ to –ρ in the EA 
 η = 1.197 η = 1.217 η = 1.237 η = 1.257 η = 1.277 η = 1.297 η = 1.317 
Currency specification        
	gn 0.0074% 0.0081% 0.0087% 0.0093% 0.0098% 0.0104% 0.0109% 
	gk 0.0226% 0.0223% 0.0219% 0.0216% 0.0212% 0.0209% 0.0206% 
	gy 0.0138% 0.0140% 0.0142% 0.0144% 0.0146% 0.0147% 0.0149% 
	U 0.8364% 0.8524% 0.8678% 0.8828% 0.8973% 0.9113% 0.9249% 
M1 specification        
	gn 0.0472% 0.0512% 0.0550% 0.0587% 0.0623% 0.0657% 0.0691% 
	gk 0.1436% 0.1413% 0.1390% 0.1368% 0.1346% 0.1326% 0.1305% 
	gy 0.0872% 0.0886% 0.0899% 0.0911% 0.0923% 0.0935% 0.0946% 
	U 5.4867% 5.5926% 5.6952% 5.7946% 5.8909% 5.9844% 6.0752% 
 
Table 2b: Growth and welfare effects of reducing µ to –ρ in the US 
 η = 1.187 η = 1.207 η = 1.227 η = 1.247 η = 1.267 η = 1.287 η = 1.307 
Currency specification        
	gn 0.0136% 0.0148% 0.0160% 0.0171% 0.0182% 0.0193% 0.0203% 
	gk 0.0268% 0.0264% 0.0260% 0.0256% 0.0252% 0.0248% 0.0244% 
	gy 0.0187% 0.0193% 0.0198% 0.0203% 0.0209% 0.0214% 0.0219% 
	U 0.7983% 0.8290% 0.8587% 0.8874% 0.9152% 0.9422% 0.9684% 
M1 specification        
	gn 0.0269% 0.0292% 0.0315% 0.0338% 0.0359% 0.0380% 0.0400% 
	gk 0.0529% 0.0521% 0.0512% 0.0504% 0.0496% 0.0488% 0.0481% 
	gy 0.0368% 0.0380% 0.0391% 0.0401% 0.0411% 0.0421% 0.0431% 
	U 1.5835% 1.6444% 1.7034% 1.7605% 1.8159% 1.8695% 1.9216% 
 
 
